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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
This is an appeal by the government of a criminal 
sentencing order. The defendant, Kenneth Higgins, was 
sentenced for an offense committed while serving a 
previous term of imprisonment. The district court ordered a 
portion of the sentence to run concurrently with the 
previously imposed sentence. The issue on appeal is 
whether the district court properly construed its discretion 
to order concurrent sentencing in view of Sentencing 
Guideline S 5G1.3. The district court had jurisdiction under 
18 U.S.C. S 3231, and we have jurisdiction over the appeal 
of the sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291 and 18 U.S.C. 
S 3742. Because we find that the district court employed an 
erroneous legal standard, we will vacate the judgment of 




On May 5, 1995, a federal grand jury indicted Kenneth 
Higgins on a charge of conspiring to mail threatening 
communications as prohibited by 18 U.S.C. S 876, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. S 371. While incarcerated in a 
Maryland state correctional facility, Higgins caused a letter 
to be sent to a corporate executive in New Jersey. The letter 
falsely claimed knowledge of a contract to kill the executive. 
In the letter, Higgins offered for a $2,500 fee to furnish a 
copy of a tape recording which purportedly contained the 
name of the person who wanted the executive dead as well 
as the actual murder solicitation. The executive contacted 
the FBI, which discovered that Higgins had had his 
girlfriend send the letter. When questioned, the girlfriend 
 




admitted typing and mailing the letter at Higgins' direction. 
The FBI determined that Higgins was responsible for 10 
identical letters which had been sent to executives 
throughout the country. 
 
Following his indictment, Higgins pled guilty to 
conspiracy to commit mail fraud, a charge carrying a 
statutory maximum sentence of 5 years. At the sentencing 
hearing on December 11, 1996, Higgins did not dispute the 
length of the 5-year term of imprisonment imposed, which 
was less than his Guidelines range of 77 to 96 months.1 
Higgins did request, however, that the court exercise its 
discretion to run all or part of the 5-year sentence 
concurrently to his previously imposed state sentence. In 
response, the government argued that, because Higgins' 
offense was committed while he was serving a term of 
imprisonment, Sentencing Guideline S 5G1.3(a) mandated 
that the 5-year sentence be imposed consecutive to his 
state sentence. 
 
Citing our decision in United States v. Nottingham, 898 
F.2d 390 (3d Cir. 1990), the district court held that, 
notwithstanding the mandatory language of S 5G1.3(a), a 
trial judge had discretion under 18 U.S.C. S 3584(a) to 
order a sentence to run concurrently or consecutively. 
Believing that a 5-year consecutive sentence would be 
excessive punishment in Higgins' case,2  the court ordered 
that 48 months of the sentence would run concurrently to 




1. The Guideline range was a product of the offense level of the mail 
fraud charge and Higgins' long criminal history. Higgins had previously 
been convicted of rape, assault with intent to rape and battery, robbery 
with a deadly weapon, and assault with intent to maim. He had also 
been convicted of a number of offenses committed while in detention. 
Since 1987, he had been serving essentially a 35-year sentence in the 
so-called "Super Max" Maryland Correctional Adjustment Center. 
 
2. The court found that Higgins, who was already 27 years of age and 
had been in prison from age 17, would not be eligible for release from his 
state sentence for at least 7 to 10 years. The judge stated that 
incarcerating Higgins for an additional 5 years would not be cost 
effective, fair, or just, and that Higgins should exercise this 
"opportunity 
for redemption" while he was still relatively young. 
 






Our review of a construction of the Sentencing Guidelines 
is plenary. United States v. Oser, 107 F.3d 1080, 1083 (3d 
Cir. 1997); United States v. Holifield, 53 F.3d 11, 13 (3d Cir. 
1995). On appeal, the government argues that the district 
court erred in its reliance on Nottingham and that the court 
did not have discretion to order any portion of Higgins' 
sentence to run concurrently. In particular, the government 
contends that, unlike the version of S 5G1.3(a) criticized in 
Nottingham, the amended S 5G1.3(a) reposits sufficient 
overall discretion with the sentencing court to be 
compatible with 18 U.S.C. S 3584(a). Higgins, on the other 
hand, maintains that S 5G1.3(a) is invalid to the extent that 
it removes any of the trial court's discretion to order 
concurrent sentencing and that the court had discretion in 
any event to order a downward departure from the 
guidelines. We hold that the court below misapplied 





The United States Sentencing Commission is empowered 
under 28 U.S.C. S 994(a) to promulgate guidelines for 
sentencing courts to use, including "a determination 
whether multiple sentences to terms of imprisonment 
should be ordered to run concurrently or consecutively." 
28 U.S.C. S 994(a)(1)(D) (1994). While not legislative 
enactments, the guidelines are binding on courts with the 
force of law. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 
391 (1989) ("[T]he Guidelines bind judges and courts in the 
exercise of their uncontested responsibility to pass sentence 
in criminal cases."); Nottingham, 898 F.2d at 393. Section 
5G1.3 of the guidelines provides: 
 
       S 5G1.3 Imposition of a Sentence on a Defendant 
       Subject to an Undischarged Term of Imprisonment 
 
       (a) If the instant offense was committed while the 
       defendant was serving a term of imprisonment 
       (including work release, furlough, or escape status) or 
       after sentencing for, but before commencing service of, 
       such term of imprisonment, the sentence for the 
 




       instant offense shall be imposed to run consecutively 
       to the undischarged term of imprisonment. 
 
       (b) If subsection (a) does not apply, and the 
       undischarged term of imprisonment resulted from 
       offense(s) that have been fully taken into account in 
       the determination of the offense level for the instant 
       offense, the sentence for the instant offense shall be 
       imposed to run concurrently to the undischarged term 
       of imprisonment. 
 
       (c) (Policy Statement) In any other case, the sentence 
       for the instant offense may be imposed to run 
       concurrently, partially concurrently, or consecutively to 
       the prior undischarged term of imprisonment to 
       achieve a reasonable punishment for the instant 
       offense. 
 
U.S.S.G. S 5G1.3 (1995). 
 
Thus, in two instances S 5G1.3 removes a sentencing 
court's discretion to impose a concurrent or consecutive 
sentence: (1) when the subsequent offense was committed 
while serving (or awaiting to serve) a term of imprisonment, 
in which case consecutive sentencing is mandatory; and (2) 
when the prior offenses have already been taken into 
account in determining the offense level, in which case 
concurrent sentencing is mandatory. In any other 
circumstances, the choice of a concurrent or a consecutive 
sentence is at the discretion of the district court. 
 
The district court relied on our decision in United States 
v. Nottingham for the proposition that S 5G1.3(a) is invalid 
because that section, which mandates a consecutive 
sentence, conflicts with 18 U.S.C. S 3584(a), which provides 
generally that a district court has discretion to order either 
a concurrent or consecutive sentence. In Nottingham, the 
defendant had been convicted of a series of offenses 
committed while on parole. At that time, S 5G1.3 provided: 
 
       Convictions on Counts Related to Unexpired Sentences 
 
       If at the time of sentencing, the defendant is already 
       serving one or more unexpired sentences, then the 
       sentences for the instant offense(s) shall run 
       consecutively to such unexpired sentences, unless one 
 




       or more of the instant offense(s) arose out of the same 
       transactions or occurrences as the unexpired 
       sentences. In the latter case, such instant sentences 
       and the unexpired sentences shall run concurrently, 
       except to the extent otherwise required by law. 
 
U.S.S.G. S 5G1.3 (1987). Because the Guideline left no 
discretion to impose concurrently any part of the sentence 
for the new offenses, the district court sentenced the 
defendant to 282 months imprisonment consecutive to the 
15-year balance of his unexpired term. On appeal, the 
defendant argued that the elimination of a trial court's 
discretion to impose a sentence concurrently or 
consecutively was in direct conflict with 18 U.S.C. 
S 3584(a), which provides in relevant part: 
 
       If multiple terms of imprisonment are imposed on a 
       defendant at the same time, or if a term of 
       imprisonment is imposed on a defendant who is 
       already subject to an undischarged term of 
       imprisonment, the terms may run concurrently or 
       consecutively . . . . Multiple terms of imprisonment 
       imposed at different times run consecutively unless the 
       court orders that the terms are to run concurrently. 
 
Holding that the Guidelines on the subject of consecutive 
and concurrent sentences "must be consistent with 18 
U.S.C. 3584(a)," we vacated the sentence for the reason 
that S 5G1.3 could not usurp the district court's discretion 
to impose a concurrent sentence. Nottingham, 898 F.2d at 
394. 
 The government urges us to distinguish Nottingham on 
the grounds that the version of S 5G1.3 in dispute here is 
substantially different from the version criticized in that 
case. The 1987 version of S 5G1.3 removed all of a trial 
court's discretion to order concurrent sentencing in any 
case where the defendant was serving an unexpired 
sentence. By contrast, under the current S 5G1.3, the 
sentencing court retains discretion to impose a concurrent 
or consecutive sentence in the class of cases where the 
defendant is subject to an undischarged term of 
imprisonment, yet has not committed the instant offense 
while serving or awaiting to serve a term of imprisonment. 
 




In fact, by the time we decided Nottingham, the 
Sentencing Commission had already amended S 5G1.3. We 
noted that the rationale for this amendment was an 
attempt to reconcile the scope of the Guideline with the 
provisions of 18 U.S.C. S 3584(a). Nottingham, 898 F.2d at 
395. In view, therefore, of the Commission's awareness of 
the conflict between the statute and the Guideline and in 
further view of the subsequent amendments to S 5G1.3,3 we 
conclude that our decision in Nottingham is no longer 
relevant in assessing the validity of the present S 5G1.3(a). 
 
For this reason, we find that the district court's reliance 
on Nottingham in defining its discretion to impose a portion 




Having determined that Nottingham does not govern the 
outcome here, the question remains whether the revised 
S 5G1.3(a) is nevertheless invalid because it deprives a 
sentencing court of some of its discretion to impose 
concurrent or consecutive sentences under 18 U.S.C. 
S 3584(a). Higgins contends that, even if the current version 
of S 5G1.3 has returned a measure of discretion to the 
sentencing courts, the conflict with the statutory authority 
persists. According to Higgins, the court's discretion cannot 
be limited by a sentencing guideline in any way, provided 
the court complies with the terms of S 3584(b) and 
considers the factors in 18 U.S.C. S 3553(a) in its decision 
to impose a sentence concurrently or consecutively to an 
undischarged term. The government argues, however, that 
the guideline is a permissible channeling of a court's 
discretion or, in the alternative, that complete discretion is 
still available through application of the standard Guideline 
departure procedures. 
 
A Guideline cannot trump a statute with which it 
conflicts. See United States v. Sabarese, 71 F.3d 94, 96 (3d 
Cir. 1995); Nottingham, 898 F.2d at 394. However, where 
the text permits, a rule, guideline, or regulation should be 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The Commission amended S 5G1.3 in 1989, 1991, 1992, 1993, and to 
its present form in 1995. 
 




interpreted harmoniously with a statute dealing with the 
same regulatory matter. Rice v. Martin Marietta Corp., 13 
F.3d 1565, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1993); LaVallee Northside Civic 
Ass'n v. Virgin Islands Coastal Zone Management Comm'n, 
866 F.2d 616, 623 (3d Cir. 1989) (a court should attempt 
to reconcile seemingly discordant statutes and regulations). 
A statute and regulation "should be construed so that effect 
is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be 
inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant, and so 
that one section will not destroy another unless the 
provision is the result of obvious mistake or error." 
Silverman v. Eastrich Multiple Investor Fund, L.P., 51 F.3d 
28, 31 (3d Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). Thus, a 
construction of S 3584(a) and S 5G1.3(a) is preferred which 
does not require that we find the two provisions to be in 
conflict. 
 
That a court is provided broad, general discretionary 
powers to impose sentences does not preclude limitation of 
that discretion in certain cases by the Sentencing 
Commission. Section 3584(a) does not by its express terms 
confer limitless discretion on the trial court in all cases. 
Instead, it states that "if a term of imprisonment is imposed 
on a defendant who is already subject to an undischarged 
term of imprisonment, the terms may run concurrently or 
consecutively" (emphasis added). "One can . . . read the 
statutory words `may run concurrently or consecutively' as 
nonetheless permitting the Commission to write guidelines 
that say when, and to what extent, terms should be 
concurrent or consecutive." United States v. Flowers, 995 
F.2d 315, 317 (1st Cir. 1993) (Breyer, C.J.); cf. United 
States v. Gondek, 65 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1995) (finding no 
clash between the broad discretion under S 5G1.3(c) of the 
Guidelines and a restrictive directive in the application 
notes). We find no inherent conflict between the general 
discretion granted under S 3584(a) and the limitation of 
that discretion in certain instances by the Guidelines. See 
Holifield, 53 F.3d at 13 (discretion employed by a 
sentencing court under 18 U.S.C. S 3584(a) to run a 
sentence consecutively or concurrently is "subject to 
S 5G1.3"); see also Oser, 107 F.3d at 1083 (observing that 
S 5G1.3 guides a district court's discretion). Where the 
Sentencing Guidelines prescribe circumstances, under 
 




which the court should impose the sentence either 
consecutively or concurrently, a district court is not free to 
exercise unfettered discretion.4 
 
Our conclusion is reinforced by the reasoning of the 
Supreme Court in United States v. Gonzales, 117 S. Ct. 
1032 (1997). At issue in Gonzales was 18 U.S.C. S 924(c), 
which mandates that a sentence, for the crime of using or 
unlawfully carrying a firearm during and in relation to the 
commission of a federal felony, be imposed consecutively to 
any other term of imprisonment. The defendant argued that 
S 924(c) conflicted with the district court's discretion under 
S 3584(a) to run the sentence concurrently. The Court held 
that the two statutory provisions were "entirely consistent" 
because discretion was limited only in a narrow range of 
circumstances. 117 S. Ct. at 1036. Section 924(c) was not 
in conflict with the broad language of S 3584(a) because "[i]t 
leaves plenty of room for a court to run other sentences -- 
whether for state or federal offenses -- concurrently with 
one another pursuant to S 3584(a) and USSG S 5G1.3." Id. 
Similarly, we find that S 5G1.3(a) is not in conflict with 
S 3584(a) merely because the Guideline limits sentencing 
discretion in the exceptional case of an offense committed 
while serving or awaiting a term of imprisonment. In the 
vast majority of circumstances contemplated by S 5G1.3, 
courts retain discretion to run sentences concurrently or 
consecutively. 
 
Here, Higgins had committed his subsequent mail fraud 
offense while serving a term of imprisonment. The district 
court believed incorrectly that S 5G1.3(a) was invalid 
because it conflicted with S 3584(a) and that the court 
therefore was not constrained to impose a consecutive 
sentence. Higgins' sentence as imposed by the district court 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. This conclusion is consistent with our opinion in United States v. 
Oser, 107 F.3d 1080 (3d Cir. 1997). At issue in Oser was the 
applicability of Guideline S 5G1.3(b), which mandates a concurrent 
sentence where the undischarged term of imprisonment resulted from 
offenses fully taken into account in computation of the new sentence. 
Although this provision is as inhibiting upon a sentencing court's 
discretion as S 5G1.3(a), the issue was not raised in Oser that S 5G1.3(b) 
was in conflict with 18 U.S.C. S 3584(a). 
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was based on an erroneous legal standard and must be 
vacated. 
 
Finally, we are not persuaded by Higgins' contention that 
the reasons discussed by the district court for imposing a 
partially concurrent sentence were sufficient tofind that a 
proper downward departure from the Sentencing Guidelines 
was made. In order to depart from the Guidelines, the court 
must find "an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a 
kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into 
consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating 
the Guidelines that should result in a sentence different 
from that described." 18 U.S.C. S 3553(b); see also Koon v. 
United States, 116 S. Ct. 2035, 2044 (1996). In ordering a 
downward departure, the sentencing court must adhere to 
the requirements of 18 U.S.C. S 3553(c)(2), which requires 
that the court state "the specific reason for the imposition 
of a sentence different from that described" by the 
Guidelines. See Oser, 107 F.3d at 1087 (permitting 
departure provided the court "indicates its reason for 
imposing the penalty in such a way as to allow us to see 
that it has considered the [Guideline] methodology") 
(citation omitted). Here, while the district court made 
reference to such factors as Higgins' age and the closeness 
in time of his prior offenses, it neither indicated that these 
factors were present to an exceptional degree nor provided 
a cogent rationale for departure. We find such articulation 
insufficient to satisfy the requirements of S 3553(c)(2).5 On 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. We find it unnecessary to address the government's alternative 
argument that, while S 5G1.3 may conflict with the language of S 3584(a), 
the guideline departure mechanism adequately preserves a court's 
discretion. A few circuits have resolved the apparent conflict in this 
fashion. See, e.g., United States v. Schaefer, 107 F.3d 1280, 1285 (7th 
Cir. 1997), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Jul. 3, 1997) (No. 97-5125) 
(holding that "while S 5G1.3(a) creates a presumption in favor of a 
consecutive sentence, sentencing judges are free to depart from the 
Guidelines and order a downward departure, so long as they comply 
with the procedures required for downward departure in general outlined 
in 19 U.S.C. S 3553(c)(2)"); see also Flowers, 995 F.2d at 317, United 
States v. Shewmaker, 936 F.2d 1124, 1127-28 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. 
denied, 502 U.S. 1037 (1992); United States v. Stewart, 917 F.2d 970, 
972-73 (6th Cir. 1990); United States v. Miller , 903 F.2d 341, 349 (5th 
Cir. 1990); Fossett, 881 F.2d at 980. We emphasize, however, that the 
power of the district courts to depart from the Sentencing Guidelines is 
not unfettered. 
 




resentencing, however, the issue of a downward departure 
can be considered by the district court if such an 




For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the judgment of 
sentence and remand for resentencing in a manner not 
inconsistent with this opinion and the Sentencing 
Guidelines. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
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